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Abstract 
This article addresses the problem of formulating efficient and reliable operational preservation            
policies that ensure bit-level information integrity over long periods, and in the presence of a diverse                
range of real-world technical, legal, organizational, and economic threats. We develop a systematic,             
quantitative prediction framework that combines formal modeling, discrete-event-based simulation,         
hierarchical modeling, and then use empirically calibrated sensitivity analysis to identify effective            
strategies. 
Specifically, the framework formally defines an objective function for preservation that maps a set of               
preservation policies and a risk profile to a set of preservation costs, and an expected collection loss                 
distribution. In this framework, a curator’s objective is to select optimal policies that minimize              
expected loss subject to budget constraints. To estimate preservation loss under different policy             
conditions optimal policies, we develop a statistical hierarchical risk model that includes four sources              
of risk: the storage hardware; the physical environment; the curating institution; and the global              
environment. We then employ a general discrete event-based simulation framework to evaluate the             
expected loss and the cost of employing varying preservation strategies under specific            
parameterization of risks. 
The framework offers flexibility for the modeling of a wide range of preservation policies and threats.                
Since this framework is open source and easily deployed in a cloud computing environment, it can be                 
used to produce analysis based on independent estimates of scenario-specific costs, reliability, and             
risks. 
We present results summarizing hundreds of thousands of simulations using this framework. This             
exploratory analysis points to a number of robust and broadly applicable preservation strategies,             
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provides novel insights into specific preservation tactics, and provides evidence that challenges            
received wisdom. 
Significance 
Deploying cost-effective, reliable bit-level long-term preservation at scale remains an unsolved           
problem. [Rosenthal 2010; Altman ​et ​al. 2015] Memory organizations have identified a number of              
high-level ‘best practices’, such as fixity checking and geographically distributed replication, but            
there is little specific guidance or empirically-based information on selecting specific preservation            
strategies that fit a curating institution’s risk-tolerance, threat profile, and budget. Thus, while cloud              
storage vendors such as Amazon tout 99.999999999% durability; these claims typically lack            
substantial explanation or even clear definitions [see e.g. Mellor 2018] Further, professional            
memory organizations vary significantly in the practices they use, and how they use them -- even in                 
the number of copies held. [Gallinger ​et​ al. 2017]  
Strategies for preserving digital information are generally based on the observation that neither             
digital media, nor formats, nor institutions are reliably durable. While a number of 'good practices'               
are recognized for digital preservation, many of these practices are heuristic, and most are based on                
experience with particular technologies and threats. Stewards of digital information are faced with a              
large set of choices in developing a preservation strategy. These choices include document size and               
data format; file encryption and compression; storage media durability and reliability; collection            
replication, distribution, verification, and repair. [see e.g. Gallinger ​et ​al. 2017] These choices have              
the potential to change dramatically the cost of a preservation strategy, and how (and where) that                
strategy is vulnerable to a wide range of threats. Moreover, changes in these factors interact in                
complex ways, making it difficult to discover optimal/efficient strategies. 
This article addresses the problem of formulating simple, efficient, and reliable operational            
preservation policies that ensure bit-level information integrity over long periods, and in the             
presence of a diverse range of real-world technical, legal, organizational, and economic threats. We              
develop a systematic, quantitative prediction framework that combines formal modeling,          
discrete-event-based simulation, hierarchical modeling, And then use empirically calibrated         
sensitivity analysis to identify effective strategies. 
 
Methodology 
The ultimate goal of information preservation is to communicate across time. Our concrete             
objective, broadly speaking, is to maintain a collection of documents, so that its contents can be                
read at a designated future time. Communication will be deemed a success if at some designated                
future time the integrity of the documents has been maintained. (In the full paper we extend this to                  
the case where additional context about formats, encryption, etc. must be preserved so that the               
document can be meaningfully rendered.) 
More formally, we model the curator's task as the selection of preservation practices and              
parameters (e.g., auditing frequency) based on feasible practices and available systems, such that             
preservation costs are minimized, such that the expected loss of content does not exceed the               
curator’s target given a specified risk profile. (In the full paper, we also model a dual problem of                  
minimizing loss given a fixed budget.)  
Curators might wish to be aware of the technologies and concerns in the areas we cannot control.                 
In defining the curatorial strategy, we focus on those elements that curators are likely to readily                
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control [Gallinger, ​et ​al. 2017] ​: the number and distribution of copies, how to audit and repair                 
these, and whether to apply file transformations such as compression or encryption.  
Prior work by [Baker ​et al. 2006], which we extend, uses single-level simulation to examine a core                 
tradeoff between replication and auditing. Others have used related approaches -- such as Markov              
Chain Simulation [Lebrecht ​et al. 2011; Li ​et ​al. 2012] to estimate data failure at the hardware                 
storage layer under simplified threat models in relation to the choice of storage approaches (e.g.               
RAID configuration). Work such as [Pinheiro et al. 2007] summarizes empirical rates of storage              
failures -- we use this and subsequent work to calibrate the model we present.  
Where both cost and loss functions are simple and behaved, it may be possible to find the optimal                  
solution through closed-form mathematical analysis or simple Monte-Carlo simulation. However, in           
more realistic conditions, risk of loss is a complex function of multiple threats at multiple levels [see,                 
e.g. Rosenthal, et al. 2005] -- including low-level media failures, mid-level events such as              
manufacturing defects that affect clusters of media, and high-level events such as government             
action that can simultaneously affect multiple replicas of entire collections. Thus we use             
computationally-intensive discrete event simulation to estimate the losses under different proposed           
strategies.  
Our underlying storage model is also hierarchical. A client (library) has a collection of documents in                
digital form. These documents are recorded on sectors of a storage medium; errors in the sectors                
within it cause a document to be lost -- as illustrated in ​Figure 1​. As also illustrated in Figure 1, large                     
documents are larger “targets” than small documents and are therefore more likely to be hit by                
random errors. 
 
Figure 1: Documents are stored on sectors of disk (or other) storage. Large             
files occupy more sectors than small files. When errors occur randomly in            
sectors, large files present a larger "target area" and are more likely to be hit               
by an error. In this study, we treat a document with any sector errors as               
corrupt.  
A copy of the collection of documents is stored on a server maintained by a separate institution. If                  
the client maintains multiple copies of the collection of documents, then several copies are stored               
on separate, independent servers. Customers retrieve documents from the server(s) to read them.             
An error may occur that corrupts a portion of a document or makes that copy inaccessible. In this                  
case, we consider the copy to be lost. Other copies may still persist. If all copies of a document are                    
lost, then the document itself is permanently lost.  
Specifically, we are concerned with four hierarchical levels of failures that affect document             
collections. 
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● Disk Sector Failures. Small scale errors in disk recording can result in partial or total failure                 
of a document copy. For the purposes of this study, we have assumed that a single failure in                  
the body of a document's data causes the document to be considered lost.  
● Environmental Glitches. The rate at which errors arrive in disk sectors is not always              
constant. Transient environmental conditions, "glitches," such as failures of HVAC, electrical           
noise, and such can raise the rates of sector errors.  
● Server Failures. Data servers are not immortal. Companies may go out of business, be              
bought by or merge with other companies, change their mission, and so forth. Our research               
covers a range of expected lifetimes of server companies.  
● Major Shocks. Economic and regional environmental conditions can cause multiple servers           
to fail in short periods of time. Economic downturns can stress many companies in an               
industry. Regional environmental disasters such as earthquakes, floods, wars, and such can            
result in failure, or inaccessibility, of multiple servers. And government censorship can make             
servers or groups of servers inaccessible and lost to a replication set of servers. Such               
correlated failures are a serious threat to a collection and require more intense monitoring              
by the client library to ensure the health of the collection.  
In Table 1 we summarize these failure types, their distribution, and their visibility. We also provide 
examples of real world failures that one can  represent using these event types.  
 Characteristics Exemplar Threats 
Layer Role Visibility Distribution Lower 
Frequency 
Higher 
Frequency 
(lower 
severity) 
Hardware  
(Sector) 
Causes  sector 
error / single 
document loss 
Silent.  1 Poisson event Controller 
failure 
Media 
corruption. 
Local 
environment 
(Glitch) 
Increases rate 
of storage error 
Invisible . 2 Poisson event of 
some duration 
HVAC failure Power 
spikes 
Institution 
(Server 
Failure) 
Causes loss of a 
single copy  of a 
collection 
Silent. Exponential 
Lifetime 
Ransomwar
e 
Business 
failure 
Curator 
error. 
Billing 
error 
Macro 
Environment 
(Major 
Shock) 
Increases rate 
of server failure 
Invisible. Poisson duration Corporate 
Mergers 
Recession 
Immediate  loss 
of multiple 
servers  
Silent or 
visible 
Poisson event  Government 
Suppression 
Regional 
war 
 
Table 1: A Hierarchical Typology of Preservation Threats.  Small errors corrupt storage 
sectors of individual documents.  Greater threats cause entire server(s) to fail, losing all 
copies of documents on the server(s).  
Note that these distributions imply some assumptions about operations: 
1 Detected on audit 
2 ​Inferred through indirect effects on other error 
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- The model assumes that some form of local error-correcting storage, such as RAID is used,               
and that the benefits of server-local error correction, such as the use of RAID storage be                
incorporated in the logical sector error rate. Thus the sector error rate should reflect the               
ex-post rate of sector failures, after any RAID repairs. This rate effect of different RAID               
configurations, pattern of single disk failure and subsequent repair, etc. are not directly             
modeled.  
- The model assumes that a storage unit is replaced, and content automatically migrated,             
after its normal service life. If not, sector failure risk would typically accelerate after the 3-5                
year service lifetime of the initial hardware. We can still model failure to migrate media               
modeled through introduction of environmental glitches that increase sector error failure. 
- The model assumes that the failure of institutions is conditionally independent, absent            
shocks. In other words, when two servers share an internal dependency -- such as reliance               
on the same third-party storage layer, a shock should also be added to the model to reflect                 
that dependency. 
A Simple Cost Model 
Many storage vendors may be available to a client, each with charge schedules. For the most part,                 
vendors will charge for storage and bandwidth. 
● A charge per month per byte stored (usually per gigabyte or petabyte). The cost of storage                
may vary by "quality" of storage, based on its typical error rate or perhaps on speed of                 
retrieval access.  Storage is charged per copy; multiple copies cost more. 
● A charge per month per byte sent in or out ("ingress" and "egress" charges). Bytes sent do                 
not distinguish between user access for normal retrieval and administrative access for            
auditing.  The cost may vary by speed or reserved bandwidth (Mbps). 
● Charge schedules for storage and bandwidth may include quantity discounts. 
For the purposes of this study, a client will store a collection on a set of servers of the same "quality"                     
level. Documents with differing quality requirements are considered separate collections and are            
stored and managed separately.  
 
 
 
Results 
In this section we show how simulation of the multi-level failure model can be used to design a                  
robust preservation strategy: First, we start by modeling sector-level errors that cover a very wide               
range of error rates, more than three orders of magnitude. We find that maintaining multiple copies                
of a document collection, along with a regimen of regular auditing, can preserve the collection over                
a range of error rates wider than is likely to be encountered with real commercial disk drives.                 
Second, we introduce small and large glitches, which increase the base error rate from two to ten                 
times. We find that such temporary excursions are indistinguishable from minor or even major              
differences in the base error rate, and that the prior strategy remains robust. Third, we introduce                
whole server failure. We find that, by incrementally increasing the number of copies and auditing               
frequency, a client library can protect the collection against individual server failures over a wide               
range of server lifetimes. Finally, we introduce major shocks that increase the rate of server failure                
and/or simultaneously eliminate up to three servers. We find that sufficiently increasing frequency             
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of auditing and repair can protect a collection against even the shocks induced by major recessions                
and minor wars. 
 
Constructing a Preservation Strategy that is Robust to Base Storage Quality 
If a collection exists as only a single copy, then it is very likely that some of its documents will be lost                      
within a decade, even if the storage medium is highly reliable. ​Figure 2 shows the likelihood that a                  
single document will be lost, over a decade, depending on the sector lifetime of the storage medium.                 
Further, even if the rate of error accumulation is much lower than illustrated above, many               
documents will be lost over longer periods of time: For example, over 50 years, about 20 parts per                  
million (ppm) to 200ppm of the collection will be lost, depending on document sizes, even if media                 
reliability were 10x the maximum shown.  
 
 
 
(2A) (2B) 
Figure 2. (2A) A single copy of a document collection suffers considerable losses             
over a short period of time, even with a very high quality storage medium. (2B)               
Over long periods, even very large numbers of unaudited copies will suffer            
permanent losses. The shaded area covers what we consider to be the plausible             
region of disk quality.  
A single copy of a document is vulnerable, regardless of the quality of its storage medium. Multiple                 
copies of collections are less vulnerable but still deteriorate over long periods, as sometimes random               
errors will coincide to cause a permanent loss where all copies of a document have been corrupted.                 
Simulations demonstrate that, without regular auditing and repair, no ​reasonable ​number of copies             
will prevent significant document losses over a long period See ​Figure 3​, which shows expected               
losses with various numbers of multiple unaudited copies. 
In addition, we simulated environmental disturbances such as variations in temperature, humidity,            
dust, etc., due to HVAC or electrical problems that act to accelerate sector failure for a period of                  
time. We find that the effect of such “glitches” has the same effect as directly increasing the base                  
error rate. Moreover, this similarity implies that preservation strategies (such as those we             
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recommend below) that are robust across a range of sector failure rates are also robust to                
moderate to severe glitches that increase the sector error rate by factors of three to ten times.  
Estimating a range of deterioration rates of sectors 
At what rate do disk sectors deteriorate and lose document information stored on them? Very little                
direct information is available from manufacturers or from large disk consumers such as cloud              
storage facilities regarding either theoretical or empirically measured error rates at the sector, file or               
collection levels. Most published claims regarding storage reliability are either so ill-defined as to be               
unmeaasurable (see e.g., Mellor 2018 on AWS and Azure claims of “sixteen nines” of reliability),               
entirely theoretical (see. e.g. Rosenthal 2010, on the calculation of mean-time-to-data-loss by            
storage manufacturers), or measure the failure of entire drives during a service lifetime. Based on               
these latter, evidence-based estimates, hard-drives fail at the rate of roughly 1.25-4% annually (see              
Backblaze 2018) -- when deployed professionally.  3
If no redundancy (e.g. RAID, erasure codes) is deployed at the filesystem level, the observed disk                
failure rate would be an upper-limit on sector life as well -- if the disk cannot be read, no sector                    
within it could be read. Based on the lowest observed rate of 1.2% annually, and typical drive sizes                  
of 1-2TB, the implied maximum sector half-life of a non-RAIDED system would be 250,000KH.              
However, this number is implausibly ​low in an environment in which some file-system redundancy is               
used -- at this level we would observe frequent losses of large files. For realism, we assume that                  
RAID or other filesystem is deployed effectively to the extent that the system can be run in                 
production without obvious failures.  
Closed-form calculations based on the assumption of Poisson arrivals of sector errors can be used to                
approximate sector reliability based on experience with small storage systems. How high a sector              4
failure rate would the average computer user tolerate on, say, a system disk? Under a reasonable                
set of assumptions about document size and sector size, we find that half-lives for megabyte-size               
disk regions less than about 100 megahours (100E06 hours) would result in a noticeable proportion               
of files being lost in the first few years of operation, for example, more than two percent of                  
documents in just the first two or three years of disk use. Such losses would render an operating                  
system disk unusable, and would certainly be too high for a data (document) archive. At the other                 
end of the reliability spectrum, sector half-lives more than approximately 1,000 megahours would             
characterize disks that were nearly perfect and very long-lasting. In the absence of sound empirical               
data on this topic, we consider the range of sector half-life from 100 megahours to 1,000 megahours                 
to be a plausible range for commercial disk drives that corresponds to real-life experience.              
However, due to the possibility of environmental glitches (failures of air conditioning, noisy electrical              
power, etc.) that increase error rates, we would extend the realistic range down to 20 or 30                 
megahours, as shown in the shaded region of Figure 2B.  
3 Electronics generally experience accelerated failure rates during their initial burn-in period, and              
after their service lifetime (see e.g. Xin, et al 2003). And most hard drives are designed for a service                   
life-time of 3-5 years.  
4 To simplify calculations and to make our results more accessible, we have simplified some of the                  
numbers and units in the simulations and graphs. Error rates for disk sectors and for servers are                 
stated in half-lives in units of kilo-hours and mega-hours. Also, simulation event time periods are               
stated in “metric years” of 10,000 hours. We feel that this change in the length of a year makes the                    
results slightly more conservative, since the simulation’s year and ten-year periods are somewhat             
longer than calendar years. Also, to save compute cycles in simulations, the collection size is set to                 
10,000 documents; results are easily extrapolated to larger collections. 
IDCC20 | ​Paper 
8   ​|​   Selecting efficient and reliable preservation strategies  
The Need For Auditing 
We must adopt active auditing strategies to detect and correct errors in data in order to preserve                 
the corpus over long periods. Such strategies must include three components: detecting errors by              
fixity information or other means; correcting errors, usually by replacing a damaged copy with a               
known good copy; and actively locating errors by patrolling through the data to examine all the                
documents. (Baker, et al 2006) 
We need to be wary that failures -- of documents or servers -- are ​silent to the client. A client cannot                     
afford to wait until a document is requested to discover that all copies have been lost. An auditing                  
system must actively search through the data for latent errors in order to locate (and repair) them                 
before these errors pile up and overwhelm the redundancy of storage.  
An auditing cycle may be accomplished in a single pass through the documents or broken up into                 
several “segments.” It is important to note that total auditing requires that all copies of a document                 
be checked during each auditing cycle. A document may be assigned to any segment within a cycle,                 
but it must be present in some segment of each cycle. The sampling of documents for each segment                  
of the auditing can be systematic or random; but it is important that the auditing actually examine                 
all documents. That is, auditing segments must sample documents ​without replacement each cycle.             
Sampling with replacement permits some documents to be missed in each cycle and reduces the               
effectiveness of auditing. 
Random auditing is often expressed as, for instance, "audit ten percent of the documents every               
month." The difference between this random strategy and segmented auditing is that the random              
selection may be chosen ​with replacement​. Thus it is likely that some documents will escape auditing                
during each cycle. This observation is analogous to the experiment of throwing a thousand balls               
randomly into a thousand urns. Since the balls arrive according to a Poisson distribution, some of                
the urns will receive no balls, some one, and some more than one, according to distribution.                
Documents that are audited zero times are not being audited effectively at all and thus are                
vulnerable to undetected loss.  
Figure ​3 illustrates the effectiveness of simple annual auditing across a very wide range of sector                
failure rate over a long period. 
  
IDCC20 | ​Paper 
Micah Altman and Richard Landau   ​|​   9 
 
(3A) (3B) 
Figure 3: Simple annual auditing and repair of a collection greatly reduces            
document losses. (3A) Note that just three copies with annual auditing is more             
robust than five unaudited copies. (3B) Even over very long periods of time, e.g.,              
100 years, simple annual auditing can protect a collection with a modest number             
of copies. Over the plausible range of sector lifetimes, five copies with auditing             
suffer minimal or zero losses.  
The pattern illustrated by the figure (and confirmed through additional sensitivity analysis)            
demonstrates that a strategy of deploying five independent replicas and simple annual auditing is              
sufficient to maintain the integrity of collections for over a century across any practical variation in                
storage quality conditions. In the full paper, we extend these results to include robustness to               
higher-level correlated threats, and to analyze more sophisticated and efficient preservation           
strategy. 
Constructing a Preservation Strategy that is Robust to Institutional Risks 
Strategies against limited server lifetimes or shocks 
Cloud-based storage services provide very reliable storage, largely through the use of            
error-correcting storage methods, such as RAID, erasure coding, and high-count replication. These            
error-correcting techniques make the failure rate for disk sectors largely irrelevant. Such storage,             
properly maintained, is effectively "immortal" and will suffer no significant losses over long periods.  
Let us shift our analysis from the reliability of storage media to the reliability of storage services. We                  
will find that similar analysis and similar storage techniques can be used to protect documents and                
entire collections.  
Storage services themselves are not immortal. Services as corporations may fail over time; they may               
merge and thus lose their independence; they may be subject to physical trauma through natural               
events or political or economic disturbances. And access to services may be blocked by government               5
action, by cyber attack, or by administrative error (such as a problem with service billing). In any                 
case, it is important to note that such failures are generally silent: the client is not actively informed                  
of the failure.  The client will notice the failure only when trying to access the stored documents. 
There are many ways that a server can fail and render a copy of the collection inaccessible. Table                  
nnn lists a number of conditions that can cause one or more servers to fail. Let's consider just two                   
causes of server failure: first, that servers as corporations have finite lifetimes; and second, that               
exogenous physical events or government actions may make it impossible for a server to continue to                
function. We note that a shock that raises the rate of failure of a single server is equivalent to a                    
server with reduced life expectancy.  
5Reviews of firm mortality suggest that the half-life of firms is no more than a decade, and likely                  
shorter in the technology sector and during recessions. (Morris 2010; Daepp 2015) Recessions are              
frequent relative to this lifespace --see (NBER 2019)  for data on US recession frequency. 
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To protect a document collection, a client library must actively test, and if necessary repair, the                
integrity of document collections stored remotely on such services. Server failures, regardless of the              
cause, are almost always silent to their clients: earthquakes, floods, wars, mergers, bankruptcies,             
and government censorship actions do not give notice to the parties affected. A client must examine                
all servers on a regular basis to verify the presence of the document collection stored there. The                 
client must actively audit storage services to verify that they are still alive and still have the                 
collections. Due to the assumed high reliability of storage within a server, we assume that a server                 
contains all documents or none. If a service is still alive and contains any documents, then the                 
service is still available as one of the client's replication instances. If a service is found to be inactive,                   
then, to maintain the target number of replications, the client must find a new service and populate                 
that with the collections.  
This process is clearly analogous to the auditing of individual documents to repair documents              
corrupted by sector failures, but in this case, it is merely the presence of the server that is to be                    
tested. We find also that the auditing process can be much more efficient than with sectors: to                 
verify that the server is alive, only a few documents need to be retrieved. Either the server is dead                   
and contains no documents, or it is alive and contains all documents. 
When a client detects a server failure of this sort, the redundancy of the collection storage is                 
(temporarily) reduced. The client must find another server to hold a copy of the collection and then                 
transmit the entire collection to that server. Only then is the collection fully replicated with the                
desired number of copies. 
The simulation framework demonstrates that server lifetime is an important risk factor. The             
replication strategy previously developed (shown in Figure 3), although robust to sector failures and              
glitches, will fail (that is, result in collection losses) if the server failure rate is high. For that simple                   
strategy -- five copies audited annually -- to preserve a collection over long periods of thirty to one                  
hundred years would require servers to have half-lives of at least eight to ten years. To require all                  
servers to have such long life expectancies is optimistic. However, on the bright side, collection loss                
can be prevented even with relatively short-lived servers by substantially increasing the auditing             
frequency and adding additional replicas.  
  
(4A) (4B) 
Figure 4: The impact of auditing speed on preservation of a collection. If servers have finite                
(random) lifetimes, due to economic downturns, mergers, etc., failures can result in losing the              
collection. (The lifetimes used here are short, to illustrate the effects.) (4A) Annual total              
auditing shows a significant risk of losing the entire collection over a range of short but                
plausible server lifetimes. (4B) Annual auditing in four quarterly segments -- so that every              
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server is verified four times a year rather than only once -- dramatically improves the survival of                 
a collection. Increasing the speed of auditing, say, in monthly segments would further improve              
the likelihood of survival.  
 
Strategies against correlated server failures 
The strategy above is robust to server failure -- when servers fail independently. However, server               
failures may be correlated in two ways. We model these correlations formally, through introducing              
“shock” events of varying types, severity, and frequency. 
We use two statistical approaches to model shocks. First, we model shock that ​decrease the               
expected lifespan of some or all servers. ​Second, we model shocks that ​cause immediate failure of                
multiple servers simultaneously. ​Our simulations included a range of "shock" conditions that            
contribute to server failures; modeling such threats as recession, targeted censorship, administrative            
error.  
For the most part, our results show that the most important factors are the frequency of shocks and                  
their "span," that is, the number of (correlated) servers affected by a shock. Overall, shocks that                
raise the rate of single server failure have an impact equivalent to reducing the expected lifespan of                 
all servers. That is, whether the cause of a server’s premature failure is exogenous, through               
economic or political pressure, or endogenous, due to financial instability, the result is the same: a                
single server fails at some random time with some frequency independent of other servers. This               
failure reduces the redundancy of the storage of the collection and therefore increases the risk of                
collection loss.  
 
 
Figure 5: The effect of economic pressures on institutional failures. ​For any chosen level of                
redundancy that protects the collection in normal circumstances, economic recessions will           
increase the rate at which the servers that keep copies fail. Severe recessions will cause               
institutional failures sooner than mild recessions, but still, over time, some institutions will fail.              
Without a strategy to detect and repair these failures, the redundancy of collection storage is               
reduced and the likelihood of collection loss is increased.  
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In contrast, shocks that cause multiple simultaneous failures can dramatically increase the likelihood             
of collection loss. In our simulations, we have found that the major protective factor against               
correlated failures is the speed of detecting a dead server. The client should test all the servers for                  
responsiveness very frequently, such as quarterly or monthly; in very severe cases, testing should be               
done even faster, e.g., weekly .  
Again, it is important to note here that it is not necessary to test the entire collection, or even a large                     
segment of it, during each audit. Since a server either contains all documents or contains none, the                 
client need only probe a few documents during each audit to determine the health of the server.                 
This dramatically reduces the bandwidth requirements and increases the speed with which a client              
can test all its servers.  
Thus a strategy of having X copies audited every Y period can be robust even in the presence of                   
frequent widespread shocks: such a strategy is likely to withstand both major recessions and minor               
wars. As ​Figures 6 and 7 below illustrate, protecting a collection under conditions of frequent large                
shocks, economic or political, may require increasing the redundancy of storage to seven or eight               
copies, and increasing the frequency of auditing of servers from quarterly or monthly to weekly.  
  
(6A) (6B) 
Figure 6: The impact of moderately severe correlated failures of servers over ten years. In these                
cases, shocks that cause two servers to fail immediately occur randomly with half-lives shown              
on the X axis. (6A) Five copies of a collection with quarterly auditing is not sufficient to protect                  
against a high probability of total loss. Increasing the redundancy to seven copies also does not                
protect the collection sufficiently. (6B) Accelerating the rate of auditing, e.g., to weekly             
segments, and possibly increasing the redundancy level slightly, can improve the survival of the              
collection even under these severe conditions. Recall that auditing to determine the presence             
of a server requires interrogating only a few documents on each server.  
\ 
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(7A) (7B) 
Figure 7: The impact of very severe and frequent correlated failures of servers over ten years. In                 
these cases, shocks that cause three servers to fail immediately occur randomly with half-lives              
shown on the X axis. Much more frequent auditing of more copies is required to protect a                 
collection. (7A) For shocks where three servers are removed from service, even frequent             
monthly auditing with many more copies, up to nine, cannot protect the collection from total               
loss. (7B) Accelerating the auditing to weekly and increasing the redundancy to eight copies              
may suffice to protect a collection from total loss even under these extremely harsh conditions.  
 
We note that a combined strategy might be a good choice: Audit the collection on an annual cycle                  
in weekly segments; every week choose two percent of the collection, selected ​without             
replacement​, to be audited. Replace any servers found to be not functioning with new servers,               
and repopulate the new servers with the entire collection. Using this strategy, redundancy of five               
copies should protect the collection in all but the most dire circumstances. Increasing the              
redundancy to seven or eight copies should protect the collection even in very severe upheavals.  
 
Corollaries - Applications of the Multi-Level Model to Other Failures 
In this section we show how the existing simulation results can be applied to modeling additional                
threats, including attacks against the auditing system; encryption-key loss and other related            
correlated failures; and fragility induced by document compression.  
Augmenting the Core Replication Strategy with Distributed Auditing 
In the model above auditing always returns the correct results, when invoked. In practice, the               
auditing system itself may fail either due to a fault in the auditing software, or to a malicious attack                   
against the auditing system.  
Risks due to unintentional faults in the auditing system may be mitigated by using multiple               
independent software implementations to perform the proof-of-retrieval. For example, in an           
auditing system that involves retrieval of the object content, followed by computation of a              
cryptographic hash on the contents; computation of this hash could be replicated using multiple              
independent implementations of the hashing algorithm. More generally, to prevent loss due to             
well-resourced attacks against the auditing system itself, a secure auditing system that engages             
multiple auditors should be used [see Jin et al 2019 for a review]. Further, since in the worst case, a                    
well-resourced adversary could subvert one or more of the auditors, at least 3​s​+1 servers will be                
needed to provide ​byzantine fault tolerance -- ​where ​s ​ is the maximum number of subverted nodes.  
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Thus in a world without any types of server failures (besides malicious attack), deploying seven               
servers would be sufficient to protect against subversion of two. Distributed preservation systems             
such as LOCKSS, have each server play the role of both a content replica, and an independent                 
auditor. When using distributed preservation, or in other systems in which auditing servers can fail               
at random, additional replicas will be needed to ensure that sufficient ​uncorrupted replicas remain.               
For example, if there are two potentially subverted servers, and external shocks can destroy three               
servers simultaneously at random, then post-shock, two out of four of the remaining servers could               
be corrupted. Thus with a shock-span of three, ten replicas are necessary to prevent against               
orchestrated attacks by two subverted noded on the auditing system that are launched following a               
failure. Eight copies would be sufficient, if the adversary controls at most one auditing node.  
Applying Analysis to Replication of Encryption Keys 
We identified loss of encryption keys (or more generally of shared secrets -- where at least n are                  
needed to reconstruct the key) as a threat to content above. In this section we discuss strategies for                  
evaluating the impact of encryption key loss, and mitigating these risks. As it turns out, it is not                  
necessary to add encryption directly to the discrete simulation model described above -- we can               
evaluate this risk using the existing model. 
Encrypting a collection of content creates three additional threats of loss. First, and most important,               
losing all copies of the encryption keys for the collection effectively results in a loss of all replicas of                   
the collection -- while the bits comprising such collections may continue to exist, they are rendered                
meaningless. Second, if the knowledge of the encryption algorithm is lost, the collection is likewise               
destroyed. Third, encryption may make documents more fragile -- a single block loss will destroy the                
entire document rather than a portion. 
The last threat (fragility) has a minor impact (see the next section) and is readily mitigated, if                 
necessary, by adding an additional copy to the replication scheme. The second threat (algorithm              
loss) can be effectively mitigated by selecting a well-known standard encryption algorithms --             
standard algorithms are widely documented, and independently replicated. Thus, we focus on the             
threats from loss of encryption keys. 
Loss of encryption key may be modeled by treating the keys as a small, separate collection of                 
documents. As we have shown above -- mitigating risks of loss to a collection requires replication,                
auditing, and repair. For security reasons, encryption keys should be kept in separate administrative              
domains than the content they encrypt. We recommend that a separate set of 'servers' be used to                 
replicate the collection of encryption keys. 
Because the size of the collection is small (encryption keys are very small relative to the content they                  
protect), risks to the collection of keys will be dominated by 'shocks' that disrupt organizations and                
affect multiple replicas. For example -- wars, economic recessions, and government actions may lead              
to organizational failures -- thus we recommend maintaining at least four copies of the encryption               
key and auditing the integrity of the keys (e.g. a challenge mechanism) at least monthly. 
Modeling Risks of File-Format Obsolescence 
At first blush, file-format obsolescence appears to present a radically different form of risk that the                
bit-loss modeled. After all a collection may be lost to format-obsolescence even if all of the replicas                 
are intact -- bit-level auditing does nothing to prevent this. 
It is possible to model file-format obsolescence in a way that parallels server-level failure, and thus                
use server- and shock- analysis to estimate risks of loss, and to develop mitigation strategies. In this                 
model: 
- Formats represented as individual collections, containing a test corpus of documents in that             
format. 
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- Servers represent independent versions of format readers -- software that is able to read              
and semantically validate objects of that format. (Readers should be independent within a             
format, but a single reader may be used for multiple formats.) 
- Format obsolescence is represented by server failure. If a reader can no longer be executed               
it has “failed”. If all readers fail, the collection is unintelligible, and the format is lost.  
- Sector- and glitch level errors are ignorable. (Following similar logic as used in the analysis of                
encryption key loss above.) 
- Server failure is discovered through auditing. Auditing a server consists of executing the             
corresponding reader against the test corpus. 
Unlike storage systems, there is less evidence to assess the distribution of failures of software               
readers -- it is likely that software failures follow a modified bathtub curve. In this case the                 
assumption of an exponential distribution of reader failure would yield overly optimistic predictions             
for loss. Notwithstanding distributional assumptions, by conditioning on using format readers that            
are established (past their infant mortality period), modeling with a conservative (lower than             
expected) expected lifetime, and modeling shocks that cause multiple readers to fail simultaneously,             
we can generate strategies that are robust to format failure. 
Since software reader failure is driven primarily by changes in the operating environment, we              
anchor our half life estimates to the support lifetime of operating systems version. In particular, a                
plausible but very conservative assumption is that half of software readers fail to run without               
modification after a major operating system revision. Over its thirty year history, the Windows              
operating systems has undergone a major update every six years on average, and the supported               
lifespan of each revision has averaged twelve years [Wikipedia Contributors 2019]. Thus, based on              
the server failure analysis shown in figure 4b, using five independent readers to test format               
readability at each major software release, accompanied by migration of formats, when five             
functioning independent format readers can no longer be identified, should be sufficient to protect              
against format failure indefinitely. Further, as the analysis above shows, the risk of failure is strongly                
dependent on the frequency of auditing: Thus a strategy of format assessment using three              
independent readers should be successful indefinitely, if a more sophisticated timing of audits is              
planned -- e.g. verifying readability annually, and in advance of planned operating system updates              
and of support end-of-life. dates.  
Modeling Compression Risks 
Documents stored on digital media are fragile; storage errors corrupt the content of a document.               
How much of a document is corrupted depends largely on the data format of the document. Even                 
small errors in highly compressed or encrypted documents may render part or all of the document                
unusable. 
For documents that might not be fatally corrupted by a single sector error, lossless compression of                
the document involves a clear trade-off. A smaller document is a smaller target for a randomly                
occurring error, but a highly compressed document is more fragile. A small error in an audio or video                  
file, or an uncompressed text file, might not be fatal to the document, but a highly compressed text                  
document (or an encrypted document) might be lost. 
In these simulations, for simplicity we have modeled documents as very fragile: one sector error               
causes the document to be judged as lost. As it turns out, straightforward closed-form              
transformations of the previous simulation results can be used to model the effects of lossless               
file-level compression and document fragility on overall collection loss. 
In this model, at least these two considerations should be included in the decision to compress                
documents. 
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● Smaller is safer. A smaller document presents a smaller target for random errors. If a               
document is compressed, say, by 90%, that is, to 10% of its original size, then a random                 
error is only one-tenth as likely to strike that document. When placed on a storage medium                
of any given quality level, that smaller, compressed document is likely to persist without              
error ten times longer than the uncompressed version. 
● Smaller is less expensive. A stored collection incurs costs for both storage of the document               
images and the bandwidth used in auditing and repair. Smaller documents consume less             
space and less bandwidth and therefore cost less to maintain. On a given budget, a               
compressed collection can be replicated into more copies and audited more frequently.            
Both the increased copy count and more frequent auditing contribute directly to reducing or              
eliminating permanent losses in the collection. 
The linear increase in document losses based on size is to be expected from straightforward Poisson                
calculations. In addition, we ran simulations over a wide variety of conditions to verify that this                
linear relationship holds for multiple copies of collection documents, various auditing strategies, and             
a very wide range of storage quality (error rates, sector lifetimes). 
Compression offers another major advantage: potentially higher redundancy. If compression          
reduces a document's size by, say, 50%, then a client can store two copies of the document for the                   
same cost in storage. That extra copy provides higher redundancy and thus greater resistance to               
document loss. On a fixed budget, a client can store additional copies of documents depending on                
how effective the compression algorithm is. High compression permits more copies to be replicated              
to offset any increased fragility of a compressed document. Text and image compression are              
particularly effective in this regard. 
A disadvantage of compression is that it may make documents that were partially repairable more               
fragile. We use a simple model to explore the effects of fragility. In a given collection, the fragility of                   
each document is represented by a number, ​F, ​that indicates the proportion of damage done by                
each single sector loss. For example, an ​F of 1 indicates that single sector loss causes entire                 
document loss; fragility of 2 denotes that a single sector loses reduces the value of the document by                  
half, etc.  
For the purpose of loss prediction a collection of robust (not fragile) documents can be modeled as a                  
more numerous collection of smaller, fragile documents. More precisely, the expected proportion of             
losses due to block failure for a collection ​C ​of ​N ​documents, each of size ​S ​and fragility ​F ​is identical                     
to the expected proportion of losses in a collection C’ comprising (N*F) documents, each of fragility                
1, and  size S/F.  
Thus, lossless document-level compression affects the likelihood of collection loss through four            
distinct mechanisms. First, compression directly reduces document size (modeled as a ‘compression            
ratio’ of 1/​C​), which acts directly to reduce expected loss. Second, compression can increase the               
fragility of the compressed document ​F’​, where F ≥ F’ ≥ 1. Third, compression reduce the total size                  
storage size needed for the collection by -- enabling more replicas to be created. Finally,               6
compression permits more aggressive document auditing, to protect a collection, without increasing            
costs for bandwidth and server egress. The same number of smaller, compressed documents can be               
retrieved more quickly without increasing bandwidth, and consume less bandwidth and less egress             
charge from the storage vendors. Auditing of the collection can be done more frequently on the                
same budget, which improves document survival rates. 
6 In addition compression may introduces a risk of format obsolescence. Fortunately, there are              
effective file-level compression algorithms that are very well standardized and documented. Further,            
the risks from format obsolescence may be managed effectively through auditing format-readers, as             
described above.  
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The effects of additional replicas can be understood by considering “repair” of collections through              
replacement of documents. In our model, collections are "repaired" by having missing documents             
on their servers replaced from other copies; that is, the "repairability" of a collection depends on the                 
presence of one or more valid replacement copies stored elsewhere. If compression permits an              
additional copy or copies of a document to be stored, then there will be more copies from which a                   
replacement can be effected when one copy fails and a collection needs to be "repaired." For                
example, if five copies of a collection are to be stored on servers, then a mere 20% reduction in size                    
due to compression would permit one additional copy to be stored and maintained within the same                
budget. That additional redundancy, six copies instead of five, would make the document more              
resistant to failure. 
These effects can affect loss in different direction -- when does compression reduce loss overall? The                
simplest case is of completely fragile documents (F=1) -- in this case F’=F and any amount of                 
compression is beneficial due simply to reduced “target area.” More generally compression will             
reduces loss whenever C*F’ ≥ F. Further, the simulation results above demonstrate that even              
where sector error is the dominant threat to collections (which is not generally the case) the                
benefits of increasing number of copies grows substantially up to at least 6 replicas. An implication is                 
that compression with C of 1.2 (reduction to roughly 83% of the original size) or better is usually                  
justified even when it substantially reduces document fragility over ( F >> C*F’ ). Since in practice,                 
since modern compression algorithms yield a ​C typically in the range of 2-6 on benchmark corpuses                
[Mahohen 2005​] for large collections; and methods to reliably repair damaged documents are scant              
and hard to verify, compression reduces expected collection loss in all but a few extreme cases.  
In summary, we consider lossless compression to be benign for a variety of reasons. 
Discussion 
The results above highlight a number of robust and broadly applicable operational preservation             
policies: for example, these results demonstrate that the commonly used strategy of sample-based             
auditing is ineffective; and that the risks of compression-related fragility noted by the preservation              
community, are typically more than offset by reductions in the efficiency of replication and auditing.               
More generally, we identify simple preservation strategies involving diversification, 5-7 replicates,           
and auditing partitioned weekly across every year, that are robust both to variations in storage               
quality and conditions; and robust to correlated organizational threats, including global recessions            
and regional wars.  
This analysis demonstrates that the most critical source of risk to collections is shared vulnerabilities               
across services that can result in multiple simultaneous failures. Curators who choose services for              
replication need to be wary of characteristics that results in shared vulnerabilities. These include              
geographic location of server infrastructure; legal jurisdictions to which the server is subject; and              
shared technical dependencies across servers. It is particularly important that service providers            
disclose in a verifiable way the extent to which they rely on other third-party storage vendors to                 
host content stored with them.  
Further, these results underscore the need to increase the efficiency of external auditing, since              
auditing frequency is critical to robustness. Currently, a bottleneck to auditing is the need to transfer                
the content of a document to be audited from a server to a trusted source. If storage services                  
provided an API for trustworthy verification of a document directly, costs and time would be               
substantially reduced. For instance, if a storage service offered the ability to compute, on demand, a                
combination cryptographic hash and nonce for a selected portion of a document, reliable external              
auditing could be completed with greatly reduced network bandwidth. (See Lin, et al. 2019 for a                
survey of cryptographic auditing approaches to cloud replicas.) Stakeholders in both the storage and              
preservation sectors would benefit from developing standards API’s for cryptographic verification of            
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stored content -- which increase both the trustworthiness of cloud services and the use of external                
auditing. 
Moreover, the framework we present offers flexibility for the modeling of a wide range of               
preservation policies and threats. Since this framework is open source and easily deployed in a cloud                
computing environment, it can be used to produce analyses based on independent estimates of              
scenario-specific costs, reliability, and risks. We invite the community to probe our results by              
calibrating risk profiles based on their own context and to use the system to estimate the costs and                  
losses of their preferred preservation strategies. 
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